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In the history of science of the last century, in an age of irreconcilable dichotomies mirroring 
the geo-political divide between Capitalism and Real Socialism, Marxist historians undertook 
a socio-economic investigation of science fostering an approach that came to be labeled as 
“externalist.”1 On the opposite front, that of the so-called “internalists,” an idealistic 
conception of science prevailed, one that was seen as politically correct. Its rejection of everything 
“material” was meant to immunize the discipline against socialist contamination.2 By the 
Nineties, the turn away from modernist concerns about all-encompassing interpretations 
generated a plethora of post-modern narratives in which historians’ subjectivity came to the 
foreground—often at the expense of careful source analysis and theoretical clarity.3 Broadly 
speaking, the new mainstream shows a culturalist bias whose ostensible (and celebrated) 																																																								
1 See Porter (1990) and Young (1990). Also see Long (2011). 
2 See Omodeo (2016b). 
3 I discuss this issue with Roger Cooter in Omodeo (2015). 
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advantage is to substitute the opposition between socio-economic accounts and 
theoretical/technical investigations for a more circumscribed treatment of local environments 
that takes into account (and often overemphasizes) the actors’ perspectives.4 To be sure, this 
outlook (often micro-historical, ethnological/anthropological) has served to remedy rough 
anachronisms and generalization, and the post-modernist emphasis on rhetoric and 
narrativity gave a worthy caution against the preposterous assumption/prescription of 
objectivity and detachment on the historians’ part. However, it has also produced increasing 
historical fragmentation and theoretical vagueness about epistemology and the foundations of 
science. The postmodern-cum-culturalist conjuncture raises two interrelated questions: How 
does a cultural understanding of science integrate earlier economic and technical treatments? 
Furthermore, how can a subjectivity aware historiography avoid the pitfall of relativism, well 
captured by the epistemological slogan “anything goes”? The legacy of earlier paradigms has 
remained quite obscure. In particular, the extent of their validity has not been fully reflected.  
It seems appropriate to deal with these issues beginning with a 
historical/historiographical reflection on early modern mechanics. In fact, this field has been 
at the center of much ideological skirmish since the 1930s. The most notable contrast was that 
which opposed Edgar Zilsel’s economic explanation of the rise of modern science to 
Alexandre Koyré’s defense of its purely speculative origins (Lefèvre 2001). In the following 
discussion I will recount the main motives and features of early twentieth-century social 
accounts of science. Further, I will point to how the need of a non-reductionist (neither 
economicist nor monocausal) treatment of intellectual history calls for an integration of the 
economic context and the political element for a more appropriate understanding of scientific 
development. In order to articulate my proposal, I will eventually delve into a case study in 
Chapter 7 of this volume: a discussion of the sociopolitical coordinates of a typical Renaissance 
scholar in mechanics of the generation between Girolamo Cardano and Galileo Galilei, 
Giovanni Battista Benedetti. 
 
 
The Marxist Paradigm: Mechanics between Basis and Überbau 
 
One of the most quoted and controversial passages of Karl Marx’s œuvre, his preface to Zur 
Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) (1859), offers a 
significant sketch of his conception of culture in relation to history and society. In this text he 
introduces the distinction between economic structure (Struktur or reale Basis) and juridical and 
political superstructures (Überbau), which correspond to determinate historical forms of 
consciousness. He famously asserted that: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.” (Marx 1987, 
263) Thus he affirmed the dependence of consciousness on sociohistorical settings. Similarly, 
Marx saw the ideological formations—juridical, political, religious, artistic, and philosophical—as 
rooted in the terrain of the economic conditions of production. It should be remarked that he 
did not enlist science among the ideologische Formen. Rather, he ascribed to Naturwissenschaft a 																																																								
4 The reference work that is mostly mentioned as a watershed in the history of science is Schaffer and Shapin 
(1985). See their “Introduction to the 2011 Edition: Up for Air: Leviathan and the Air-Pump a Generation On,” in 
Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and Experimental Life (2011). 
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special status. 5  By arguing that the evolution of the conditions of production 
(Produktionsbedingungen) can be investigated with the accuracy of the natural sciences, he implied 
that the latter have a degree of objectivity that is superior to that of the other disciplines. He 
did not discredit the aforementioned intellectual (ideological) realms, as they are the means 
through which people become aware of their positioning in society. And he compared science, 
in this case economy, to Dante’s descent to the hell in the third Canto of the Inferno... 
 
Qui si convien lasciare ogni sospetto 
Ogni viltà convien che qui sia morta.6 
 
For Marxist historians of science reflecting on these pages, science constituted an 
epistemological puzzle: Does it belong to the structural sphere or to the superstructural? On 
the one hand, according to the preface to the Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, natural science 
appears to escape cultural determination; this would make the analysis of its relationship to 
philosophy, art, and religion as well as to the political context superfluous. On the other hand, 
science cannot be reduced to economy tout-court. Rather, it occupies an intermediate 
epistemological position between Basis and Überbau, as its history clearly shows (see Table 1). 
From the Thirties to the Fifties, Marxist inquiries in the history of science, from Boris Hessen 
to John Bernal, Henryk Grossman and Zilsel, especially stressed the dependency of science on 
economics—and this inquiry was made more difficult by controversies over the relation 
between economics and technology. Moreover, within the Marxist tradition, debates about 
the interrelation of structure and superstructure, politics and consciousness, and science and 
ideology determined fluctuations in the understandings of science.7 Later social accounts, 
often departing from Marxism, explored the connection of science with cultural realms such 
as religion (Merton’s Weberian school), philosophy (e.g. Paolo Rossi), art (e.g. Pamela Smith) 
and politics (e.g. Mario Biagioli). 
I will begin my assessment with the earlier trend pointing out the economic roots of 
science. Boris Hessen’s “The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia”—a classic of 
Marxist historiography of science, as Gideon Freudenthal and Peter McLaughlin have called 
it—was a talk delivered at the second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology in 
London in 1931.8 Hessen was one of the Soviet delegates deputed to present and promote the 
Marxist way of the history of science. His talk on Newton was one of the most articulated 
among those delivered by the Soviet delegates, and had a lasting impact on subsequent studies 
on the Scientific Revolution. The aim of his talk was to reject the semi-mythical treatment of 
Newton’s physics as the product of a lonely genius detached from mundane interests by 
demonstrating that the Principia was the historical product of a scientific process induced by 
economy-driven technological advance. 																																																								
5 Cf. Stachel (1994). 
6 Here all misgiving must thy mind reject./ Here cowardice must die and be no more. 
7 On the oscillating assessment of the relationship between structure and superstructure and its relevance in 
cultural studies, see Hall (1980). The problem of consciousness is typically Lukácsian, whereas that of ideology 
and science is generally connected to the Frankfurter Schule. See for instance Habermas (1969). More recently, the 
Foucauldian strand has pointed out the biopolitical dimension of science, which goes beyond the “mental” 
emphasized by the concept of ideology. For an insightful discussion and case study, see Bruskell-Evans (2015).  
8 Hessen’s essay first appeared in Science at the Cross Roads (London: Kniga, 1931), reprinted in 1971 (London: 
Frank). I will cite from the most recent edition in Freudenthal and McLaughlin. (2009). 
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In order to set the theoretical stage of his analysis, Hessen began with Marx’s preface 
to the Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie whose treatment of the structure/superstructure distinction 
he summarized as follows: “The mode of production of material life conditions the social, 
political and intellectual life process of society.” (Freudenthal and McLaughlin 2009, 42, 
emphasis added) Although he stressed the dependency of the superstructure on the economic 
basis, in my opinion he left open for debate the question of whether this conditioning had to be 
seen as monocausal and deterministic or not. By contrast, the leader of the Soviet delegation, 
Nikolai Bukharin, had a clear-cut opinion on this matter. In his popularizing introduction to 
Marxist philosophy, The Theory of Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology 
(1921), he had argued, on a materialist basis, for the naturalization of the laws of social 
development as dealt with by Marxist sociology (or “historical materialism,” according to his 
understanding of it). He also embraced a strictly deterministic conception of both natural and 
social processes. He wrote that “in nature and society there is a definite regularity, a fixed 
natural law. The definition of this natural law is the first task of science. This causality in 
nature and society is objective.” (Bukharin 1934 [1921]) Social developments, according to 
him, are as predictable as eclipses or the boiling of water (ibid., 51). 
Hessen refrained from such a crude naturalization of history. Instead, he reflected on 
the dynamics of science in relation to economy and technology, on the one hand, and politics, 
philosophy and religion, on the other. However, according to the assumption of a 
fundamental dependency of the superstructural upon the structural, Hessen considered the 
socioeconomic linkage of science to be more fundamental than its cultural embedment. To 
sum up his model, “economics [...] present[s] demands, which pose technical problems, which 
generate scientific problems” (Freudenthal and McLaughlin 2009, 4). 
The economy of Newton’s time was that of the rise of early capitalism, marked by the 
expansion of merchant capital and manufacture. A new class of entrepreneurs emerged in late 
medieval and early modern Europe, and their interests were closely linked to the expansion of 
communication (and transport), industry and war. Hessen detailed the technical problems 
raised by the expansion of these three areas and the corresponding scientific fields that 
flourished during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe. First, the needs of 
communication and transport, mainly maritime, required the improvement of vessels, the 
development of new navigation techniques, especially in the Oceans, and the building of 
canals and locks. In order to tackle the technical problems of navigation, improved 
hydrostatics and hydrodynamics were needed as well as astronomical, geographical, 
mathematical and optical knowledge. Second, the most important realms of industry were 
mining and war, and the technical problems of these realms could be solved by chemical and 
mechanical experts of a variety of topics ranging from simple machines to hydro- and 
aerostatics and the science of materials. Third, the military requirements of a time marked by 
the introduction of firearms led to the perfection of ballistics and fortification techniques, the 
study of dynamics and of architecture. 
After his overview of the economic, technical and scientific characteristics of Newton’s 
age, Hessen offered a summary of the central problems faced by early modern mechanics. 
Here the main issues follow: 1. simple machines, inclined planes and statics in general; 2. free 
fall and projectile trajectories; 3. hydrostatics and aerostatics, atmospheric pressure and the 
motion of bodies through a medium; and 4. celestial mechanics and the theory of tides. As 
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collateral subjects, Hessen mentioned optics and magnetism. Additionally, he produced a list 
of the scientific protagonists—it comprised Leonardo da Vinci, Cardano, Del Monte, Stevin, 
Galileo, Tartaglia, Riccioli, Guericke, Pascal, Boyle, Kepler and a few other big names (Hessen 
in Freudenthal and McLauglin, 52). He also mentioned en passant Agricola, for mining, and 
Gilbert, for magnetism, a discipline whose economic-technological raison d’ȇtre resided in 
navigation. According to Hessen, Newton brought all of these branches of physics to a 
theoretical synthesis but this intellectual achievement should not obscure its deep economic and 
technical roots. 
After considering the structure underlying early modern mechanics, Hessen dealt with 
its superstructure. As he cautioned his listeners, “It would [...] be a gross oversimplification to 
derive every problem studied by various physicists, and every task they solved, directly from 
economics and technology. [...] The economic situation is the basis. But the development of 
theories and the individual work of a scientist are also affected by various superstructures, such 
as political forms of class struggle and its results, the reflection of these battles in the minds of 
the participants—in political, juridical, and philosophical theories, religious beliefs and their 
subsequent development into dogmatic systems.” The political context of Newton was that of 
“reformism” sanctioned by the Glorious Revolution of 1688, that is, a compromise between 
the interests of the Monarchy and those of the bourgeoisie that had heralded the English 
Revolution of 1648. According to Hessen, this climate of moderation and settlement (the 
“class compromise of 1688” as he called it) informed Newton’s piety which, in turn, affected 
the philosophical views underlying the Principia. Thus, God and idealistic assumptions entered his 
conception of nature. Although radical materialistic and mechanistic views were available in 
his time (such as those by Richard Overton, Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes and John 
Toland), Newton refrained himself from these excesses. He assumed that a teleological 
principle of divine origin preserves the universe and its order; he considered motion to be a 
mode superimposed on essentially inert matter and viewed space as a sensorium Dei separable 
from matter. To sum up Hessen’s considerations on superstructures and science, the cultural 
environment Newton operated within—in one word, his “ideology”—only accounted for the 
perceived shortcomings of his system, essentially its distance from an accomplished material 
and physical (as well as evolutionary) account of nature like the one that would be produced 
by Laplace in the time of the French Revolution.9 
It should be remarked that Hessen did not posit a unidirectional dependency of 
science on technology. Rather, he pointed out a possible feedback mechanism, that is, a 
dialectical reinforcement of technology through science and vice versa: “The immense 
development of technology was a powerful stimulus to the development of science, and the 
rapidly developing science in turn fertilized the new technology” (Hessen 2009, 84). However, 
he did not go so far as to expand this idea on a more general explanatory level: He did not 
explicitly admit a similar dialectical loop between technology and economy and, even less so, 
between economy and politics, or politics and philosophy. In other words, his conception of 
the relation of structure and superstructure did not overtly challenge economic reductionism. 
However, he acknowledged that science is affected by the cultural element alongside the 
economic-technological. As he did not survive the Stalinist purges, he could never develop 																																																								
9 A similar idea, that ideology only accounts for the shortcomings of science, has been defended by the influential 
exponent of the French épistémologie historique George Canguilhem (2009). 
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and circulate the details of his research program.10 It was Robert Merton’s achievement to 
develop Hessen’s insight by considering in more detail the incidence of technology, on the one 
hand, and puritan ethics (distinct from theology), on the other, in the natural debates of 
Newton’s time in his classic of Weberian sociology of science, Science, Technology and Society in 
Seventeenth Century England (1938).11  
With the benefit of hindsight some limitations of Hessen’s approach become apparent. 
Although he embraced a view of technology as the product of collective and largely 
anonymous human activity and, on this basis, discarded Romantic views about scientific 
genius, he nonetheless focused on the explanation of an individual work through its context and did 
not put too much emphasis on the collective production of knowledge. Ludwig Fleck’s concept 
of Denkkollektiv, referring to the collective dimension of science, and his emphasis on education 
as a central moment in the formation of a scientific culture, constitute a valid complement to 
Hessen’s conception. Regrettably, even after the publication of Fleck’s Entstehung und 
Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, 
1938), the reception of his ideas was arrested by the outbreak of WWII, Fleck’s deportation, 
and the dispersion of the German-speaking community of Mitteleuropean philosophers of 
science to whom his work was directed.12 Eventually, Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962) disseminated and popularized Fleck’s collectivist view of science, style of 
thought, and pedagogy by introducing categories such as “paradigm” and “normal science.” 
Hessen did not deal with the epistemological problem of shared knowledge and paid but little 
attention to its collective character, although he incidentally referred to seventeenth-century 
academies, the Accademia del Cimento and the Royal Society, as new places of scientific 
experimentation and knowledge production. As for teaching institutions, characterized by the 
long-lived scholasticism, he saw the early modern universities as a hindrance to the advance of 
natural and technical knowledge. As I will discuss, Zilsel’s position on the role of traditional 
education in the rise of modern science proved more detailed and comprehensive than that. 
In recent years, our understanding of the shared character of theoretical knowledge 
has been improved through consideration of its long-lasting cognitive models, or “mental 
models.” These have been defined as “instruments for drawing conclusions in the context of 
given knowledge” which “link present with past experiences by embedding new experiences in 
a cognitive network of previous experiences.”13 Unlike the platonically conceived scientific 
concepts investigated by Koyré in his idealistic history of science,14 cognitive models bypass 
the sharp separation between experience and theory by identifying durable conceptual-																																																								
10 For the intellectual context of Hessen’s work, see Winkler (2013). At his death, Hessen had an anthology of 
sources of early modern science ready for print. I am very thankful to Rose Luise Winkler and Peter McLaughlin 
for making it available at: http://www.philosophie.uni-hd.de/md/philsem/personal/hessen_textbook.pdf 
(accessed September 2, 2016). Cf. Winkler (2007). 
11 Merton (1938). Merton openly acknowledged his intellectual debt toward Hessen but limited this to the issue of 
technology. See 501–502. 
12 Cf. Schäfer (2012). On the split of rationality, Spaltung der Rationalität, resulting from the violent interruption of 
a virtuous synergy of natural science and philosophy from the mid-eighteenth century to the 1930s, see Engler 
and Renn (2010). 
13 See Renn and Damerow (2007). See Chapter 1 of this volume. 
14 Cf. Koyré (1943). This essay can be seen as the author’s manifesto of a disembodied history of science, as 
developed in his major works. The most important for the history of mechanics are Études galiléennes (Paris, 1939) 
and Newtonian Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). In “Galileo Engineer” Lefèvre criticized Koyré’s speculative 
attitude and his neglect of the social context of early mechanics. 
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experiential instruments, for instance the basic model of motion-implies-force that was crucial to a 
millenary tradition of Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian dynamics. 15  Attention to such 
elementary components of scientific thought permits us to bring into focus deep theoretical 
continuities in spite of apparent discontinuity and vice versa. For instance, one can mention 
the enduring presence and transformation of scholastic concepts in the physics of eminently 
anti-Scholastic scientists such as Galileo or Descartes (Damerow et al. 2004). Moreover, the 
inner constraints of shared models account for concomitant discoveries in the history of 
science, for instance the convergence of the methods and results in scholars working 
independently from each other, as in the case of Galileo and Thomas Harriot’s dynamics 
(Schemmel 2008). In the light of shared knowledge, issues of priority become less relevant. In 
the case of planetary theory after Copernicus, it can be argued that the acceptance of his 
epicyclical models and parameters combined with the rejection of terrestrial motion and 
eccentricity necessarily led to the independent “discovery” of the geo-heliocentric system by 
several astronomers agreeing on common premises. Consideration of such theoretical 
constraints sheds a very different light on the past polemics over priority of discovery. In this 
case, the heated and well-known polemics over the paternity of geo-heliocentrism that burst 
out between the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe and the Imperial mathematician in Prague, 
Nicolaus Reimers Ursus, should not obscure the fact that it is possible, even likely, that 
scholars working on the same research program which rests on the same premises can come to 
similar solutions to given problems.16 This instance also shows that the inquiry into the 
conceptual dimension and the inner developments of science is not unrelated to its social 
context. Rather, consideration of shared knowledge offers an additional tool for the 
comprehension of the dynamics of knowledge at both a social level and a cognitive level. 
 
Shortly after Hessen and independently from him, Henryk Grossman, a Marxist 
scholar linked to the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, dealt with questions concerning 
science and society in the early phases of modernity in Die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der 
mechanistischen Philosophie und die Manufaktur (The Social Foundation of Mechanistic Philosophy 
and Menufacture, Paris, 1935). It was a critical review commissioned by Max Horkheimer, 
directed against the Marxist historian Franz Borkenau’s simplistic treatment of early 
mechanics. In Der Übergang von feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild (The Transition from the Feudal 
to the Bourgeois World Picture, Paris, 1934), Borkenau argued that modern mechanics rose 
from a direct abstraction from the labor conditions of rising capitalism. Grossman 
reprimanded Borkenau for his lack of historical accuracy, which he saw as particularly due to 
a literal and rigid application of Marx’s periodization, as well as an insufficient understanding 
of early-capitalist social developments. Most importantly for our present concern, Grossman 
argued that mechanics originated from reflection on machine technology in the late Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance. According to a thesis, which is also known as the “Hessen-
Grossman-Thesis,” “technology was developed in order to facilitate economic development, and 
science developed by means of the study of the technology that was being applied or developed” 
(Freudenthal and McLaughlin 2009, 4). 																																																								
15 Cf. Renn and Damerow (2007). 
16 See Omodeo (2014). 
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Grossman mentioned Da Vinci as the Idealtyp of modern mechanical thought. 
Moreover, he took Descartes into consideration, alongside Boyle, Galileo and Hobbes, to 
make the point that, for these early scientists, mechanics was first of all a theory of machines. As 
Grossman observed, “the machines mentioned by Descartes [...] can be divided into four 
categories: artillery, clock, water and lifting machines, [they] also represent the most 
important areas of practical mechanics, by which the basic concepts and laws of theoretical 
mechanics could be developed. Mechanics was only slowly created by the struggle of human 
ratio with the empirical material.”17 Hessen, who shared this view, also brought forward the 
reverse argument: The fields of physics that did not come to the forefront of the discipline in 
the seventeenth century are those that could not rely on a sufficiently developed technology 
(e.g. the science of heat, due to rudimentary steam engine technology) (Freudenthal and 
McLaughlin 2009, 20). 
This insight by Hessen and Grossman has proved fruitful in the history of mechanics. 
In recent years, the study of the interrelation of technology and science has received new 
impetus. Accurate studies on Renaissance mechanics have deepened the link of this discipline 
with machine technologies. As has been argued, theoretical knowledge was gained through 
abstraction from experience and the reflection on “challenging objects” such as balances, 
turning wheels or projectiles.18 Practice-oriented mathematicians like Cardano, Tartaglia, Del 
Monte, Benedetti, Stevin and Galileo built on craftsmen’s experience and based their theories 
on technological objects from architecture, ballistic and navigation, to mention only the most 
visible developing fields of the early modern period. Grossman’s idea that seventeenth-century 
“mechanistic philosophy and scientific mechanics derived their basic mechanical concepts 
from the observation of mechanisms and machines” is still valid (Grossman 2009, 107). Today 
we can rely on detailed accounts of the interconnection between modern mechanics and 
machine technology, at the intersection of theoretical and practical activity. Indeed, the 
Renaissance was a time in which the rediscovery of Archimedes and the pseudo-Aristotelian 
Mechanical Problems merged with the scholastic science of weights, paving the way for the 
physics of Galileo and Newton and seventeenth-century mechanistic ontologies.19 
 
 
From Economic Structures to Organic Intellectuals: the Gramscian Moment 
 
Working in the same years as Hessen and Grossman, the political leader and thinker Antonio 
Gramsci, who was a prisoner of the Fascist regime, reflected on epistemology, culture and the 
status of science in a direction that was specifically aimed at avoiding economic reductionism. 
His Quaderni del Carcere (Prison Notebooks) bear witness to his indirect knowledge of and 
interest in Grossman’s approach to economy.20 As far as science is specifically concerned, 
Gramsci built up his positions in direct and explicit opposition to Nikolai Bukharin’s scientist 																																																								
17 Cf. Grossman in Freudenthal and McLaughlin (2009, 141). 
18 On statics, cf. Renn and Damerow (2012). On turning objects, cf. Büttner (2008). On Ballistics, cf. Valleriani 
(2013). For studies in the history of mechanics making use of the concept of “challenging object,” see Renn 
(2001) and Bertoloni Meli (2006). 
19 For a recent treatment of this trajectory, see Renn and Damerow (2010). 
20 Gramsci (1975, 890). The title of this section is inspired by one of the most updated introductions to Gramsci, 
Thomas (2009). 
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Marxism. He accused the Soviet intellectual of vulgar materialism, rejected his assumption that 
the study of human society and history should be founded on positive science (historical 
materialism seen as Marxist sociology) and refused a monocausal and deterministic outlook on 
society. In order to reject Bukharin’s positions, as expounded in Theory of Historical Materialism 
and in the intervention at the London congress of 1931, Gramsci offered a different reading of 
Marx’s preface to the Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, one that emphasized the superstructural 
element. As one reads in his notes (Gramsci 1975, Notebook XI 64), “The issue of ‘objectivity’ 
of knowledge according to the philosophy of praxis [i.e. Marxism] can be developed 
beginning with the statement (entailed in the Critique of Political Economy) that ‘men become 
conscious (of the conflict between material productive forces) in the ideological terrain’ of 
juridical, political, religious, artistic and philosophical forms.”21 These words clearly show that 
Gramsci—who even undertook an Italian translation of Marx’s preface in his translation 
notebooks (Gramsci 2007)—did not see the architectonic metaphor of Basis and Überbau as 
implying economic necessity and the unidirectional dependency of the ideological forms on 
the structure.22 Rather, he set the accent on Marx’s observation, in the same preface, 
regarding the epistemological relevance of superstructures as the means by which people 
grasp and conceive of their positioning in the world. Thus, Gramsci pointed out the 
superstructural conditioning of science but added a significant specification: “One can say, 
however, that in the study of superstructures, science occupies a special place [un posto 
privilegiato], for its relation to the structure has a particular character, wider in extension and 
closer as far as the continuity of its development is concerned.”23 
Gramsci resorted to another metaphor, a biological one, taken from the same pages of 
the Kritik der politischen Ökonomie in which the Basis-Überbau idea is introduced. Marx stated 
there that economy deals with the anatomy of society.24 Gramsci used the image of a living 
organism to translate the architectonic relation of structure and superstructure into the 
interdependency of skeleton and skin in a living body, in which the parts concur with the 
constitution of the whole (Gramsci 1975, Notebook X 41): “Structure and superstructure have 
a necessary and vital connection. [...] One cannot say that, in the human body, the skin and 
the type of physical beauty that prevails historically are mere illusions and that the skeleton 
and anatomy are the only reality, although something similar has been said for a long time. By 
enhancing the value of anatomy and the function of the skeleton nobody intended to assert 
that man, and even less so woman, can live without the latter.”25 Gramsci’s perspective aimed 
																																																								
21 Ibid., vol. 2, 1492 (my translation): “La questione della ‘obiettività’ della conoscenza secondo la filosofia della 
prassi può essere elaborata partendo dalla proposizione (contenuta nella prefazione alla Critica dell’economia politica) 
che ‘gli uomini diventano consapevoli (del conflitto tra le forze materiali di produzione) nel terreno ideologico’ 
delle forme giuridiche, politiche, religiose, artistiche, filosofiche.” 
22 For an insightful treatment of diverging perspectives on structure and superstructure and their interconnection 
in Marxist thought, see Williams (1973). 
23 Gramsci (2007, 1457): “Si può dire, tuttavia, che nello studio delle superstrutture la scienza occupi un posto 
privilegiato, per il fatto che la sua relazione sulla struttura ha un carattere particolare, di maggiore estensione e 
continuità di sviluppo [...].” 
24 Marx (1987, 100) “[...] daß aber die Anatomie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in der politischen Ökonomie zu 
suchen sei.” 
25 Gramsci (2007, 1321): “Tra struttura e superstruttura esiste un nesso necessario e vitale. [...] Nel corpo umano 
non si può certo dire che la pelle (e anche il tipo di bellezza fisica storicamente prevalente) siano mere illusioni e 
che lo scheletro e l’anatomia siano la sola realtà, tuttavia per molto tempo si è detto qualcosa di simile. Mettendo 
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at undoing the allegations of “economicism” and “fatalistic mechanicism” often raised against 
Marxist thought. He took very seriously the historicist and idealistic objections raised by the 
philosopher Benedetto Croce, and partly accepted his criticism. Gramsci derived from Croce 
the idea that, complementary to economic analysis, a historical comprehension of society has 
to take into account culture, thought and hegemony, that is, intellectual and moral leadership 
and the construction of consensus, as essential elements of politics, besides domination and 
coercion.26 
Such considerations motivated Gramsci’s inquiries into the history of intellectuals in the 
thirteenth prison notebook. He stressed the social relevance of those intellectuals who embody 
the political aspirations of large social groups and are able to reinforce their interest by means 
of cultural and educational programs. Using a biological metaphor, Gramsci called them 
“organic intellectuals.” Their realm of activity is civil society: They can be seen indeed as 
superstructural functionaries (Gramsci 1975, Notebook XIII 1, ibid., 1518–1519). Their action is as 
important as the government of political leaders and the economic activity of entrepreneurs, 
since culture is indispensable for the living body of human society. It should be remarked that 
organic intellectuals are not only lay people, as was the case with the public figure of the 
liberal philosopher Croce, but also exponents of the clergy. Gramsci did not neglect the 
hegemonic force of the Church in the organization and direction of society by means of 
education, culture and religion. Gramsci—who was sympathetic with Max Weber’s inquiry 
into the ethical-religious side of capitalism—looked at Catholic institutions, such as the Jesuit 
Order, as historical examples of cultural hegemony. In such a perspective, the activity of a 
Renaissance Inquisitor such as the Jesuit Cardinal Robert Bellarmine proved much more 
effective in shaping modern Italy than the rather individualistic intellectual work of a 
“philosopher of immanence” like Giordano Bruno or a modern scientist like Galileo.27 
Gramsci also addressed the delicate issue of the relation between politics, culture and 
religion. He especially reflected on the Jesuit cultural endeavor, which he treated from a 
cultural-political perspective as part of a wide struggle for hegemony in the field of ideas. In 
this light, he regarded a theological champion of the Counter-Reformation such as Bellarmine 
as an organic intellectual who effectively contributed to forge and develop a vision and project 
of social order. Not only was Bellarmine’s epistemology embedded in a deeply political 
discourse, but his rehabilitation and his posthumous career as a Saint and as a Doctor of the 
Church was also part of a political project. This happened in particularly obscure years of 
European history. Bellarmine was in fact beatified in 1923, sanctified in 1931 and eventually 
elevated to the dignity of a Doctor of the Church in 1931. As Gramsci remarked in his Prison 
Notebooks, this apotheosis can be understood only against the background of the evolving 
relations between the Church and the State, of the expansion of the Jesuit influence within the 
Catholic Church and within society, and of the eventual collaboration between the Fascist 
State and the Vatican (Omodeo 2011). In those years, through the Patti lateranensi (Lateran 
Accords, 1929), Benito Mussolini obtained the support of Pius XI at the cost of a series of 
economic and civil concessions to the Church, including the teaching of religion in public 																																																																																																																																																																													
in valore l’anatomia e la funzione dello scheletro nessuno ha voluto affermare che l’uomo (e tanto meno la 
donna) possano vivere senza di essa.” Also, see Notebook X, pt. 1, 12, note 5: vol. 2, 1237–1238. 
26 Gramsci (2007, vol. 2, 1211). 
27 Cf. Omodeo (2011, 41–48). 
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schools. These new political liaisons between Italy and the Catholic Church facilitated the 
transfer from Madrid to Rome of the editorial project of the Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu, 
a vast operation aimed at presenting archival documents relative to the early years of the 
Jesuit Society to learned scholars and thus to induce a reappraisal of its history (Koch 1934). 
As for the reasons for Bellarmine’s sanctification, they shall not be searched far from these 
events. According to the Jesuit Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet in the Dictionaire de théologie catholique 
(1932), the major theological merits of Bellarmine were genuinely “political” (Le Bachalet 
1932). The significance of this strenuous opponent of the Reformation and of all heresies should 
not be restricted to his polemics against the Lutheran servum arbitrium. Rather, Bellarmine’s 
doctrine included issues such as the affirmation of the primacy of the Roman pontiff, his 
indirect power over the worldly sphere, and the superiority of his divine monarchy over human 
civil powers. Gramsci’s reflections on such a prominent early modern intellectual caution us 
against the pitfalls of studies on so-called “Jesuit science” if the political dimension is not taken 
into due account. 
As important as it is in general terms, Gramsci’s treatment of politics, culture and 
religion (and of intellectuals as cultural-political agents) does not include much discussion of 
scientists, that class of intellectuals of particular concern here.28 In the following, I will recount 
the most perceptive analyses about early modern scientists and then consider the perspectives 
that can be opened by integrating them within a cultural-political framework à la Gramsci. 
From the viewpoint of the study of scientists as intellectuals, Edgar Zilsel’s seminal 
work on the social context of science in the time of the Scientific Revolution is particularly 
relevant. In his best-known essay “The Sociological Roots of Science,” which appeared in The 
American Journal of Sociology in 1942, he investigated the origins of the figure of the modern scientist 
tracing his29 legacy back to three types of “knowledge bearers” corresponding to three “strata 
of intellectual activity:”30 university teaching, humanistic literacy and craftsmanship.  
Zilsel’s explanatory framework is economic: The rise of modern science is directly 
connected with the shift, in European history, from feudalism to capitalism, in the period 
between 1300 and 1600. He faced the question—similar to that famously investigated by the 
Marxist historian of science Joseph Needham in his monumental Science and Civilization in China 
(1954, 1st volume)—of why modern science emerged at a certain point in space and time, that 
is, early modern Europe. Zilsel (who actually identified science and modern science) sought the 
answer in the socio-economic conditions of the rising capitalist society, in which urban classes 
of artisans and merchants augmented their power at the expense of the traditional aristocracy 
and clergy. Their material interests favored a worldly enterprise such as natural science, 
opposed to transcendent theology and aristocratic military art (i.e. the cultural fields of the 
ruling classes of feudalism). Bourgeois individualism produced a shift of values. It fueled 
competition and criticism at the expense of established authority. Criticism—Zilsel argued—is 
an ingredient of modern science. Moreover, a society emerged based on a rational division of 
labor. In it, technology and technological inventions had a recognizable economic value, 
unlike ancient societies, in which slave exploitation did not make the rationalization of labor 																																																								
28 Cf. Garin (1958, 1). “Gramsci risente di tutto un clima culturale […] nella limitata attenzione rivolta […] agli 
“scienziati.” Also, see Geymonat, (1958, 148). 
29 It was only men in the period considered by Zilsel. 
30 Both expressions stem from Zilsel. See Zilsel [1942] (2000). 
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and the improvement of the means of production appear necessary. By contrast, in the age of 
early capitalism, technology (e.g. machinery) and rationalization (e.g. bookkeeping) became 
crucial and furthered the development of quantitative methods (Zilsel 2000, 936–938). At an 
intellectual level, technological advance, geographical discoveries, and economic 
transformation created a sense of superiority of modernity over tradition producing a 
profound crisis of both university scholasticism and humanism. At once, a new alliance 
between superior craftsmen and “respectable” scholars was established which constituted the 
necessary premise for the new science (Zilsel 1941, 27). Under these conditions a new type of 
intellectual emerged, as a sort of Gramscian “intellectual” concurrent with the rising 
bourgeoisie: the modern scientist, dealing with “worldly phenomena,” endowed with a critical 
mindset, and interested in practical matters and technology. 
The thesis of a causal dependency of science (in the singular) on the emergence of 
capitalism is also known in the history of science as the “Zilsel-Thesis.” Particularly relevant to 
the discussion of the intellectuals involved in scientific advancement is what we could call a 
“corollary” of the Zilsel-Thesis: The societal transformations induced by economy made age-
old prejudices and social barriers fall down, in particular the radical separation between free 
intellectual activity and manual labor. This permitted the new figure of the modern scientist to 
take shape, as somebody capable of connecting the experimental method of the lower 
craftsmen and the rational and systematic methods of upper-class elites, university-trained or 
humanistic: “On the whole, the rise of the methods of the manual workers to the ranks of 
academically trained scholars at the end of the sixteenth century is the decisive event in the 
genesis of science” (Freudenthal and McLaughlin 2009, 945). This merging of lower and 
higher cultures was no simple task. It was eased, in Zilsel’s eyes, by the establishment of a class 
of superior craftsmen who occupied an intermediary rank between university scholars and the 
humanistic literati, above them, and the mass of “artisans, carpenters, shipbuilders, 
carpenters, foundrymen, and miners,” beneath them. Superior craftsmen were acknowledged 
professionals: surgeons, makers of nautical, astronomical and musical instruments, surveyors, 
navigators and, most importantly for the history of mechanics, those whom Zilsel labeled the 
“artist-engineers.” The latter category—which Zilsel freely derived from earlier scholarship, in 
particular from Leonardo Olschki—refers to the likes of Filippo Brunelleschi, Leonardo da 
Vinci, Leon Battista Alberti and Albrecht Dürer, people who “constructed lifting engines, 
canals and sluices, guns and fortresses [...] invented new pigments, detected the geometrical 
laws of perspective, and constructed new measuring tools for engineering and gunnery” 
(Freudenthal and McLaughlin 2009, 941). These were the “immediate predecessors” of the 
modern scientist. 
The question arises: When did the modern scientist appear on the stage of history? 
Real science, as Zilsel stated, was born with Gilbert, Galileo and Francis Bacon. He extolled 
Gilbert’s work on magnetism, De magnete (1600), as “the first printed book, written by an 
academically trained scholar and dealing with a topic of natural science, which is based almost 
entirely on actual observation and experiment.” (Zilsel 1941, 1) Additionally, he observed that 
Gilbert’s critical spirit was akin to that of radically anti-Aristotelian natural philosophers such 
as Bernardino Telesio, Tommaso Campanella, Giordano Bruno and Francesco Patrizi. 
However, Zilsel saw Renaissance naturalism as the “older brother, not the father” of 
experimental science. Gilbert’s science stemmed from the practical knowledge of miners, 
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foundrymen, navigators and instrument-makers (Zilsel 1941, 24). Thus, Zilsel regarded 
Gilbert as the first modern experimentalist. 
The second prototype of the modern scientist, Bacon, who was seen by Zilsel as the 
champion of a science-oriented philosophy aiming at the control of nature and the 
advancement of learning for the common good. Bacon’s technological utopia, Nova Atlantis 
(1627), inspired the founders of the first modern scientific societies in London and Paris (Zilsel 
2000, 943–945). “Bacon, however, did not make any important discovery in the field of 
natural science, and his writings abound with humanistic rhetoric, scholastic survivals, and 
scientific mistakes.” (Zilsel 2000, 944) From this viewpoint, Bacon did not “advance” much 
further than the aforementioned Italian naturalist philosophers.  
Thirdly, Zilsel pointed to Galileo as the first intellectual capable of merging and 
harmonizing “craftsmen-like experimentation and measurement with learned mathematical 
analysis” (Zilsel 1941, 943). This is a reference to the two poles of Galilean epistemology, 
sensate esperienze and necessarie dimostrazioni. Zilsel believed that the different origin of the two 
constituents could be detected in Galileo’s stylistic choices in the Discorsi e dimostrazioni 
matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze (Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to 
Two New Sciences, 1638): Galileo presented the theorems in Latin, the language of erudition, 
and used Italian, the spoken language, for the discussion and assessment of the theories. This 
linguistic divide mirrored the social and epistemological separation that Galileo was 
successfully overcoming between the empiricism of the lower classes and the systematic 
reasoning of educated scholastics and humanists. What Zilsel neglected to mention, though, is 
that the elegant Italian spoken in the courts was not the same as the language of the folk. 
However, although this rectification might shed a different light on the persona of Galileo, who 
was a courtier rather than a popular, the idea of a double origin of his scientific method does not 
have to be abandoned. 
It seems to me that two of Zilsel’s insights are particularly fruitful when considering the 
history of science: first, his stress on the role of superior artisans and artist-engineers in the 
development of natural knowledge and mechanics; second, his identification of scholasticism 
and humanism as a rational-rhetoric culture that was at once rejected and absorbed by 
scientists and scientifically-minded philosophers of the seventeenth century. 
The relationship between artists and early scientists has proved a precious heuristic 
hypothesis in studies on artisanal and practical knowledge, often connecting science and art 
history.31 In recent years, Pamela Smith has convincingly argued that the artistic/artisanal 
experience of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance was an important constituent of early 
modern epistemology. Artistic production, seen as an activity capable of revealing the works 
of nature from inside, paved the way for experimental science; while naturalism in art 
corroborated the shift from a principle of authority, that is, the reliance on the scholarly 
tradition, to the observation of nature as the proper source of worldly knowledge (Smith 
2004). As to the social necessity of “hybrid experts” capable of bringing together the technical 
and the theoretical dimensions of knowledge, their relevance would never diminish from the 
late Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution and beyond.32 During the Renaissance, this 																																																								
31 On artisanal knowledge and its codification see Smith (2004) and Long (2001). On practical knowledge, see 
Valleriani (2017). On art and science in the Renaissance, one can look at, among others, Bredekamp (2002). 
32 Ursula Klein has made this point most forcefully in Klein (2015). 
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mediation was secured by a new group of intellectuals, already singled out by Zilsel, and later 
labeled as “scientist-engineers.” Arguably, the most eminent	 among them was Galileo, the 
latecomer of a series of court mathematicians like his protector Del Monte and Benedetti.33 In 
Galileo Engineer (2010), Matteo Valleriani has offered an accurate description of such scientist-
engineers. Galileo and his peers were well versed both in the technical and in the intellectual 
dimensions of knowledge. They underwent a period of apprenticeship of practical 
mathematics, in some field of application like architecture or the art of war, but later 
distanced themselves from artist-practitioners as they aspired to gain higher social recognition 
and prestige, especially at a court. They had a high degree of education as they mastered 
theoretical mathematics, the language of the learned, Latin, and the elegant literary Italian 
that was highly appreciated in the Renaissance courts. Scientist-engineers thus acted as 
mediators connecting the centers of power and decision, on the one side, and the workshops 
and building sites, on the other. As experts, they supervised artisanal work or gave advice on 
technical issues (Valleriani 2010, 208). As courtiers, they were additionally required to 
participate in the refined dialogical and literary culture of the elites, to serve as educators and 
to use their expertise to satisfy the curiosity of their rulers, for example, by casting horoscopes. 
I will come back to the sociopolitical issue of the courtly embedment of early modern scientists 
in Chapter 7.  
A second important aspect highlighted by Zilsel relates to the institutional settings of 
knowledge: the towns of merchants and artisans, the universities of scholastic professors and 
the municipalities and courts of the humanists. In this respect it has to be remarked that 
university history has incredibly expanded as a field of inquiry in the last fifty years. Historians 
of science today tend to see education as crucial to the understanding of the reception, 
implementation, systematization and transfer of scientific theories.34 I will limit myself to 
mentioning only a few significant contributions to our understanding of the role of institutions 
of higher education in shaping modern science. In his studies on Renaissance universities and 
in particular the Studio of Padua in Galileo’s times, Charles Schmitt has stressed the centrality 
of university Aristotelianism as a model of rational strength, epistemological reflection and 
systematicity. The clearest example of scientific advance fostered by Aristotelian training is 
William Harvey’s functional anatomy. His explanation of the heartbeat by means of a 
scholastic vis pulsiva proved superior to Descartes’ mechanical substitution of such an “occult 
quality” for a chemical-hydraulic model of the circulation of blood.35 Further studies worth 
mentioning are those by Mordechai Feingold pointing to the decisive role played by English 
universities in the development of a mathematical culture in Newton’s century and those by 
Antonella Romano on the teaching of mathematics at Jesuit colleges in France (Feingold 
1984, Romano 1999). In the history of science, an interesting case is the dissemination of 
Copernican astronomy in the network of reformed universities gravitating around Wittenberg, 																																																								
33 The figure of the “scientist engineer” was widely discussed in the history of science by Renn (2001), 
particularly in the contributions by Lefèvre (2001) and by Renn, Damerow and Rieger (2001). Valleriani 
discusses it in detail in Galileo Engineer (2010, chap. 6). 
34 For an assessment of the relevance of university history for the study of knowledge transfer, see my 
introductory chapter to Omodeo with Friedrich (2016, 3–21). 
35 See Schmitt (1981). Regarding Descartes’s views on the heartbeat see, among others, Grene (2005). As an 
insightful case study about the connection between mechanics and medicine in the seventeenth century via 
mechanicism, see Bertoloni Meli (2011). 
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in spite of the aversion of the two leading figures of the Reformation, Martin Luther and 
Philipp Melanchthon, toward the heliocentric and geokinetic theory.36 This happened as a 
side effect of the reinforcement of the teaching of mathematics and astronomy for pedagogical 
and religious reasons—a heterogony of ends that Merton already pointed out with irony 
(Merton 1970 [1938]). 
Regarding the connection of science with humanism, Zilsel rightly affirmed the 
importance of this cultural trend in the early modern period but his assessment was prejudiced 
by an exclusive consideration of the literary and rhetorical strands of humanism. Later 
scholarship has considered many instances of humanists devoted to mathematics and the 
natural sciences.37 One of the most significant was Federico Commandino whose contribution 
to the Archimedes Renaissance cannot be neglected in the history of mechanics.38 Arguably, new 
editions of classics from antiquity and the Middle Ages—including Latinized sources of 
Islamic origin—challenged modern readers, fueled debates and polemics, and disseminated 
intellectual tools that proved fundamental for the advance of science. The humanists Georg 
Peuerbach and Johannes Regiomontanus contributed to the restoration in Europe of 
Ptolemy’s mathematical astronomy while Erasmus of Rotterdam disseminated the other Ptolemy 
by publishing the editio princeps of the Geography (1533). 39  Among the innovators of 
cosmography, Copernicus and Amerigo Vespucci were both imbued with humanistic 
culture.40 To be sure, this list could be extended further. 
Thus, in the light of more recent studies on institutions of higher education and 
humanism Zilsel’s positions have to be integrated and revised; however, his suggestion to take 
them into account remains apt. Today, most historians of science agree upon the importance 
of scholasticism and humanism as cultural strands underlying early modern science alongside 
practical knowledge, but, unlike in the seminal debates of the first half of the twentieth 
century, a clarification of the general historical and epistemological coordinates that permits 
us to deal with the complex interdependency of science and sociocultural phenomena is often 
lacking. Hence, Zilsel’s program—reflecting a more general Marxist program—of an 
interconnected understanding of the economic, institutional, and sociological settings, on the 
one hand, and the individuation of the cultural strands informing science, on the other, is still 
valuable. 
Some limitations of Zilsel’s perspective should be mentioned as well. First and most 
evidently, he conceived of science as a uniquely modern phenomenon. This identification 
highlights his marked Eurocentric perspective: “Fully developed science appears once only, in 
modern Western civilization” (Zilsel 2000, 396). In this respect, Hessen’s approach was more 
nuanced. He investigated the early capitalist and social context of Newton’s Principia without 
excluding that science has developed in the past, and can be furthered in the future, in 
different socioeconomic settings—to be sure, with different characteristics than Newton’s 
science. 																																																								
36 See, among many publications on the subject, Westman (1975). 
37 The classic reference is Rose (1975), although the emphasis on humanism shows clear bias toward idealistic 
history and Eurocentrism. 
38 See, among others, d’Alessandro and Napolitani (2013). 
39 The best study on Peurbach and Regiomontanus is Zinner (1968), Engl. transl., Regiomontanus: His Life and Work 
(1990). On the wider humanistic context, also see Omodeo and Pasini (2014). 
40 On Copernicus’ humanism, see Hallyn (2000), on Vespucci, Vogel (2006). 
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Moreover, the priority Zilsel allotted to socio-economic factors and his predilection for 
the popular classes whom he saw as the main makers of modern experimental science 
produced blind spots in his historical analyses. Take his interpretation of Gilbert. As has been 
contended by critics, Zilsel’s exclusive interest in Gilbert’s experimental method made him neglect 
his participation in some of the most lively debates of his time, specifically, the insertion of his 
magnetic theory in the Copernican cosmological debates (Henry 2001). Notably, the 
controversy over the worldly or heavenly origin of early modern physics received an ideological 
connotation in the years of the Cold War. Just as Marxist scholars such as Zilsel emphasized 
experimentation, intellectual historians such as Koyré overemphasized the “Copernican 
Revolution” as the starting point of a process culminating with the Newtonian synthesis of 
terrestrial and celestial physics.41 Koyré exploited the proximity of astronomy to general views 
about the world and the divine since antiquity to argue for the spirituality of science and its 
speculative origins.42 
 
The last point I would like to raise concerns the insufficient analysis of the cultural 
dimension of modern science, in particular its relation to politics, by early social historians of 
science such as Hessen and Zilsel. To be sure, Hessen stressed the ideological dimension of the 
theological conceptions permeating Newtonian science and rightly pointed to the political 
significance of religious positions, but he did not further this line of thought. Moreover, he 
generally denied a positive function to philosophical and theological conceptions in the 
advance of science. Instead, he saw them as either accessories or hindrances to scientific and 
social progress. Zilsel looked closer at the social and cultural settings of modern science. On 
the one hand, he indicated specific places and institutions (town, university, court); on the 
other hand, he specified the main intellectual strands (empiricism, scholasticism, humanism). 
He also named the different categories of knowledge bearers, namely the artist-engineer, the 
scholastic professor, and the humanist virtuoso who merged into the figure of the modern 
scientist. However, a comparison with Gramsci’s “organic intellectuals” can show some 
limitations of Zilsel’s concept of “knowledge bearers.” While Zilsel’s scientists and intellectuals 
are described in terms of the function descending from their position, Gramscian intellectuals are 
considered in relation to the action related to their identity. This difference helps to highlight 
what was excluded from Zilsel’s consideration: the political dimension, that is, a reflection on 
agency and an understanding of institutional history in terms of hegemony and struggle. Both 
Hessen and Zilsel used arguments resting upon a rather simplistic treatment of culture, 
mechanically derived from class interests. My claim is that their lack of in-depth cultural and 
political analysis was a consequence of their philosophical premises. In Marxist terminology, 
they focused on the structural at the expenses of the superstructural or, in more plain terms, 
they almost exclusively treated the socio-economic aspects at the expense of the cultural-
political. 
This deficit was distinctly perceived by the scholars of the cultural turn of the late 
Eighties. As Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer observed in a retrospective on their most 																																																								
41 Koyré (1961); Kuhn (1959); cf. Omodeo (2016b). 
42 Ernst Cassirer’s understanding of the interconnection of astronomy and general worldviews in the Renaissance 
was led by a very different cultural agenda; his treatment was informed by the idea that the modern outlook 
coincided with a secularization of philosophy and of nature. See Cassirer (2002). 
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influential work (speaking of themselves in the third person): “The authors of Leviathan and the 
Airpump [1985] were [...] dissatisfied with the ‘extenalism-internalism debate’ [...] The 
problems, they thought, lay with the identity and coherence of the categories themselves. One 
incoherence concerned the placement of the boundary between what was deemed internal 
and what external to science. On what grounds were social and political things accounted not 
‘intellectual’? And how was it that the making and warranting of scientific knowledge was 
judged not ‘social’? Did other intellectual practices—say religion and magic—count as external 
(since they were not considered to be ‘scientific’)?” (Schaffer and Shapin 2011, XV) Leviathan 
and the Airpump sanctioned a historical approach that, since the Eighties, has devoted great 
attention to actors’ perspectives, intentions and interactions: “Intellectual historians 
increasingly identified their goal as something like recreating past action in past actors’ terms, 
and, from that point of view, the only pertinent categories and boundaries for interpreting 
past scientific action were said to be those recognized by those acting in the past.” (Schaffer 
and Shapin 2011, XV) To be sure, the culturalization of science has opened up entirely new 
fields of research—for instance the investigation of astrology and alchemy as integral parts of 
the natural discourse of the Renaissance. Moreover, after the cultural turn, the exploration of 
cultural, philosophical, and religious themes informing upon science has become common.43 
Topics such as the theological and ethical dimensions of science have increasingly attracted 
the attention of scholars interested in the ideological significance of the scientific debates of the 
past.44 
In spite of the positive fact that the field of inquiry has been expanded, I claim that this 
move has produced severe losses in our overall comprehension. It seems to me that the 
culturalist reaction to Cold-War externalism (based on the equation of externalism and 
Marxist economicism) often undergoes the opposite mistake when compared with economic 
reductionism. I would call it “culturalist relativism” (an epistemological category not to be 
confused with cultural relativism, pertaining to ethics). It mostly rests on shaky ground, due to 
insufficient clarification of the concept of culture and its relation to knowledge. It reinforces de 
facto the postmodern relativization and subjectivization of historical categories. Apart from 
epistemological difficulties—and this is not the place to expand on the philosophical 
definitions of culture from the viewpoint of historical epistemology45—the new trend in 
science studies has abandoned socio-economic considerations as ideologically flawed, thus 
throwing out the baby with the dirty bathwater. Explicit political concerns and engaged 
historiography have also become rare, as they have been substituted by “narratives.” 
In light of these developments, I claim that an integrated treatment of economy and 
politics is desirable, as it can avoid the Scylla of economic reductionism and the Charybdis of 
culturalist relativism. Since the opening up of such a third way is the problematic with which 																																																								
43 As an instance of culturalist revision (and revisionism) of earlier views about early modern science that 
emphasizes constituents such as religion, see Osler (2000). 
44 See for instance Steven Harris’s treatment of “Jesuit spirituality” as a science-driving ideology in the context of 
early modern Jesuit engagement with scientific research and teaching, along a line of inquiry that has been 
opened up by Rivka Feldhay: Harris (1989). 
45 Let me stress the relevance of the philosophical discussions at the beginning of the twentieth century, ranging 
from neo-Kantianism and empiriocriticism to historical materialism, phenomenology and the philosophy of 
symbolic forms, as an extremely rich repository of perspectives and unfulfilled potentialities. On the divorce 
between science and philosophy in the turn of the Thirties, see Engler and Renn (2010). Moreover, for a critical 
assessment of the epistemological limitations of Cold-War philosophy of science, see Reisch, (2005). 
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Gramsci specifically struggled, in particular in Notebooks X, the so-called Anti-Croce, and XI, 
the so-called Anti-Bukharin, I deem it useful to retake his insights and some of his crucial 
categories, in particular his emphasis on hegemony as a means to integrate the social-
economic analysis with the cultural-political. For that purpose, it is necessary to readdress 
fundamental questions such as the interrelation of structures and identities and, on the basis of 
a theoretical translation of Gramscian categories, integrate the social with the political.46 Back in 
the Eighties, Stuart Hall saw Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis as an alternative to structuralist 
approaches to cultural studies. Personally, I do not see the humanistic stress on agency, typical 
of Gramscian Marxism, as irreconcilable with structural analysis. As I have argued in this 
essay, it is rather the nesso vitale, the vital connection between socio-economic constraints and 
cultural-political action, that permits an integrated socio-political approach (Table 2). In 
science studies, such a perspective will permit investigation into both poles of intellectual 
history without incurring economic monocausal determinism, on the one hand, and the 
excesses of culturalist relativism, on the other.47 
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